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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendants.
JACK C. DANIELS,

Case No. 86-0466

Third-Party Plaintiff,
and Appellant,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Category No. 13.b

Third-Party Defendants and
Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association being
also Respondent.
Appellant, Jack C. Daniels (hereinafter "Daniels"),
wishes to correct assertions in the Brief of Respondent, Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter Deseret), in its
Statement of the Case section and again in its Statement of Facts
section that are not supported by the record.
First, this action is not "a third-party action
instituted by Daniels" as alleged at page 1 of Respondent's Brief,
but is, as indicated in appellant's original brief an action
initially brought by the owner of the subject property, plaintiff

herein, CEN Corporation, to which action Deseret was later added
as an additional essential party on motion of Daniels.
At page 3 of Respondent's Brief it is noted:
"On June 23, 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin
entered an order denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and decreeing that Daniels' lien was not
cancelled or vacated . . . Daniels never objected to
Judge Dee's Order Discharging Claims nor did he attack
the sufficiency of the sureties on the $75,000.00 bond."
It is submitted a fortiori that when a lien is held not
to have been replaced, that any bond submitted as a proposed
substitute therefor becomes null and void, and even though Judge
Baldwin's Order ordering that the lien not be vacated did not
expressly overrule Judge Dee's Order originally granted on ex
parte motion of plaintiff, CEN Corporation, it had that obvious
and full effect, thus relieving Daniels of any need to take
exception to sureties or further move to discharge or reverse
Judge Dee's Order.
Moreover, paragraphs 17 and 18 of Deseret's Statement of
Facts on page 7 are misleading.

Paragraph 17 says:

" . . . Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin entered an
order vacating and cancelling any lis pendens filed in
connection with the Project, but not disturbing Judge
Dee's Order Discharging Daniels' lien." (Emphasis
added.)
A copy of Judge Baldwin's Order (and the orders amended
by it) are attached as an Addendum to this brief, and it will be
noted there is no reference whatever in Judge Baldwin's Order
asserting that Judge Dee's Order discharging the lien is not
disturbed.

The Order does not refer to the lien, but that was an

oversight and was corrected by the Amended Order referred to in
paragraph 18 which says:
"On February 18f 1983, Judge Baldwin entered an
Amended Order ordering that Daniels1 'Lien not cancelled
or vacated.•"
Once again it is submitted that if a lien is not canceled or
vacated, a prior ex parte order discharging said lien cannot also
remain in effect and is thereby reversed.

It is self-evident that

a court cannot nullify a lien by ex parte order, nor for that
matter can it nullify a lis pendens (ex parte or otherwise)
referring to the action in which the lien is being foreclosed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE CALLING OF DANIELS BACK TO THE JOBSITE

DECEMBER 1, 1981, RAISES ISSUES OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE DISPOSED
OF BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In rebuttal to Point I of Deseret's Argument:

If we

read their brief correctly they seem to argue that Section 38-1-3,
Utah Code Annotated, is really three lien statutes in one. One is
for contractors and subcontractors, one for architects and
engineers, and one for miners or oil drillers. In making this
tortured argument Deseret suggests that only architects can
recover for estimates of costs or preparing maps or specifications
or drawings, etc., and that the other two classifications must
confer benefits in the way of value added to the property in order
to obtain a lienable interest.
reasons:

Such an argument fails for two

First, it ignores the clear preamble language of the

-3-

section of the code itself; and second, it makes an artificial
distinction between making estimates and lining up potential
workmen from the actual "performing of repairs."
As noted in Daniels' original brief at page 10, Section
38-1-3 begins:
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing any services or furnishing any materials used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement . . . "
(Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that both miners and architects,
contractors, subcontractors, engineers and artisans fit into the
general class of "all persons" noted above, and "any services"
also is broad enough to include the making of estimates, preparing
maps, specifications, drawings, etc. Furthermore, as originally
argued in appellant's brief, to say that an architect can recover
for making estimates and that a general contractor cannot is to
make an unwarranted distinction between the general work being
performed by both professions in connection with any construction
or mining project.

In short, to argue that Daniels' work on

December 1 was somehow of a different variety and kind than what
he had been doing during the entire period of construction (August
1980 through July 1981) is a distinction of art rather than fact
and does not appear in, nor is it supported by, any of the
language of the statute in question.
Deseret concedes at page 13:
"If he [Daniels] or his subcontractors had
actually performed the repairs, there may well have
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been a question of fact as to whether that work was
'substantial.111 (Emphasis added.)
Again, the undersigned submit that no contractor,
architect, miner or oil driller repairs or commences initial
construction without first doing the preliminary estimates, and
that such conduct constitutes an integral part of the work product
to which the lien statute relates, and that this concession of
Deseret constitutes an admission that an issue of fact really
exists here to be determined by a trial court.
An additional reason why Deseret1s argument must fail
is that the quoted statute used "improvement," giving rise to
Deseret's "value conferred" notion in the alternative not
cumulative:

" . . . any services . . . used in the construction,

alteration o£ improvement . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

That clear

language negates any universal requisite adding of value as precondition to right of lien.
None of the cases cited in Point I by Deseret make such
distinction separating the making of estimates from the doing of
actual repairs or doing of actual construction.

Indeed, the

distinction is of the making of Deseret alone.
While it may be that Deseret has come to that conclusion
by inference from the Order of Judge Fishier from which this
appeal is taken, that there must have been some benefit conferred
on the property by Daniels before he has the right to a lien based
upon work done on December 1, 1981, it is that very error which
brings this appeal before this court.
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As to the "substantiality" of Daniels1 work on December
1, 1981, Deseret seems to concede that it was not in the nature of
cleaning up, which all parties agree is not what is at issue here.
The simple truth of the matter is that plaintiff, CEN Corporation,
through its representative, called Daniels back onto the job on
December 1 after the pipes had broken, either under the guise that
there had been a breach of warranty or that it was a matter of
defective construction, and claiming thereby that it was Daniels1
responsibility to make the repairs as he had not, according to
plaintiff, CEN Corporation, completed his job. After realizing
that such action extended the lien period, plaintiff quickly
attempted to rescind, hoping thereby to undo what it had already
done.

They can't have it both ways.

They can't claim the repairs

are the responsibility of Daniels and then claim his work doesn't
relate to the original contract.

Inasmuch as what Daniels was

asked to do directly relates to the original contract, there
remains then an issue of fact as to how substantial it was.
Deseret cannot succeed by attempting to bifurcate the kinds of
work by claiming estimates and costs are not available to
contractors—only architects—since the statute does not so
provide, nor does the case law so hold.
Moreover, consistent with the view that this need to
come and do the repair work was what activated the plaintiff, CEN
Corporation, we submit as a part of the Addendum to this brief the
pleadings in a companion case filed by CEN Corporation in Salt
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Lake County Division of the Third District Court that sought to
recover damages from appellant Daniels for the bursting of the
pipes.

So, the issue of fact yet to be determined by the lower

court upon reversal by this court runs to that very basic
question: Did the plaintiff, by calling Daniels back to the
project, extend his lien rights, or did they timely rescind such
recall, get third parties to do the repair and elect to sue in a
neighboring jurisdiction for damages caused by said repairs?
Again plaintiff and Deseret are trying to have it both ways, but
at the very least, as originally argued by the undersigned, these
are issues of fact that must be submitted to a trier of fact and
cannot be disposed of by summary judgment.
POINT II: RESPONDENT, DESERET, ACQUIRED ITS INTEREST
SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECORDING OF PLAINTIFF'S MECHANIC'S LIEN AND
TAKES SUBJECT THERETO (SECTION 57-3-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953).
A.

RECORDING OF LIEN AS NOTICE.

Deseret acquired its interest in the property by trust
deed approximately one month after the recording of plaintiff's
Notice of Lien and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 57-3-2,
takes subject to whatever plaintiff is entitled to prove under
said Notice of Lien.
In its Brief of Respondent Deseret attempts to circumvent this conclusion by asserting at page 24:
" . . . the recording act has no application to the Utah
Mechanic's Lien Act."
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That statement is totally unsupported in the brief.

Even Deseret

doesn't seem to take it seriously as on page 25 they state:
"Deseret Federal submits that the requirement that a
Notice of Lien be timely filed is designed to protect
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees." (Emphasis
added.)
What Deseret does assert is that the rights of Daniels
under the mechanic's lien statute are extended beyond the
recording act. Deseret asserts that Daniels' rights accrue from
the time that the first work was done on the premises, not from
the time of the recording of the mechanic's lien. We have no
reluctance in accepting that extension of benefits, but the fact
remains that as far as Deseret is concerned it had notice of
Daniels' claims approximately one month prior to the time it
acquired its interest in the property.

The fact that Daniels'

rights are actually more extensive than that does not benefit
Deseret.
The whole purpose of requiring a mechanic's lien to be
filed in the office of the County Recorder is to give notice of
said claim to persons dealing with the property, and that in
furtherance of the purposes of the recording act. The fact that a
mechanic's lienholder has benefits which extend beyond the
recording date does not detract from the value of the recording in
giving notice.
What Deseret is apparently attempting to achieve by its
erroneous, unsupported assertion that the recording act does not
apply to mechanic's liens is to set the stage for its "side deal"
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argument on page 29 of its brief. There it is argued that since
the rights of one supplying labor or materials to real estate
arise from the time the work is commenced, that such a person
could make a "side deal" with the owner after the work commences
but prior to the time that the lien is required to be filed, and
that a third party dealing with the owner would not be able to
protect himself against such side deals.
There are a number of fallacies of that argument. First
of all, it does not present the situation we are dealing with
here. Deseret did not acquire its interest prior to the recording
by Daniels of his mechanic's lien, but rather afterwards.
Whatever arguments there may be against "unrecorded side deals,"
are not applicable to Deseret, who took with full notice of
Daniels' claim, and that would seem to be dispositive of that
argument for the purpose of this case.
Furthermore, when a lender or subsequent purchaser deals
with property upon which improvements have recently been erected,
there is always the problem of unrecorded mechanic's liens claims
to be dealt with. This is done by making inquiry as to dates of
completion, obtaining lien waivers, and of course lender's title
insurance plays an important role in this area. Had Deseret
acquired its interest in the property before Daniels had recorded
his lien, there might be a basis for arguing that Deseret should
not be bound by the estoppel, unless of course it took its
interest with actual knowledge.
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For Daniels to prevail in this action it is not
necessary for the court to rule that Daniels' rights run
uninterruped from the first day of work, on and on as extended by
"side deals" between the owner and the laborer notwithstanding the
intervening rights of truly innocent grantees or mortgagees. Each
of those situations can, and should, be dealt with as it arises.
To rule that a person who takes an interest in property after the
recording of a mechanic's lien takes subject to whatever can be
shown for that lien, will hurt no one. Those choosing to deal
with the property after knowing of such a lien can protect
themselves through escrow (or the like) or can assume the risk if
they choose to do so that the lien may be defeated on the merits,
but they certainly should not be allowed to entirely ignore the
recorded notice.

Such a holding will only help those intent on

doing mischief. Legitimate businessmen will find adequate
protection in the notice afforded by the recorded lien.
B.

DESERET WAS NOT LED INTO A TRAP.

Deseret seems to want to suggest that Daniels somehow
led Deseret into a trap. At page 33, Deseret makes the assertion
that:
"In essence, Daniels did everything necessary to induce
Deseret Federal into lending money to the owner."
There is absolutely no basis for that assertion.

Daniels was told

that if he would not record his mechanic's lien, CEN Corporation
would obtain a loan and pay him off. They did not do that. They
neither obtained the loan, nor did they pay him off as of the time
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that he recorded his mechanic's lien. Deseret did not refinance
the property until nearly one month after the recording of the
mechanic's lien. The fact that the owners of the property
misrepresented to Daniels that they were going to refinance the
property and pay him is no basis for the assertion that he was
trying to mislead or "dupe" anybody.

Had the owners received

their refinancing and paid Daniels, there would have been no lien
recorded.

If Deseret had provided financing to the owner after

the 100 days and before the lien was recorded, and had the owner
then fraudulently failed to pay Daniels, there might be some basis
for Deseret to complain. However, Deseret did the financing with
the full knowledge that Jack Daniels had not been paid and that he
asserted a claim against the property, and, having assumed that
risk, there is no reason why Daniels should not be entitled to the
protection of the recording act. Deseret certainly has not been
duped or misled.
C.

EX PARTE ORDER INVALID TO DISCHARGE LIEN, BUT DOES

INDICATE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF DESERET.
Deseret points out at page 6, paragraph 11, of the
Statement of Facts of its brief that on February 25, 1982, (the
same day the action was filed) Judge Dee entered an ex parte order
purporting to discharge Daniels' mechanic's lien upon the posting
of a bond by plaintiff, CEN Corporation, with personal sureties.
Counsel point out at paragraph 14 that this was approximately six
days before Deseret recorded its Deed of Trust.
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As Daniels1 action against the Deseret was dismissed on
a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, discovery has
never been conducted as to the actual knowledge of Deseret, but it
appears very clear that Deseret did not want to loan against the
property with the mechanic's lien outstanding, and accordingly CEN
brought the instant action to try to nullify that lien and sought
by an ex parte order to accomplish that. Having obtained the ex
parte order, Deseret went ahead with the refinancing.

It is

difficult to believe that anyone could take Judge Dee's Order of
February 25, 1982, seriously.

There is no procedure in our law

that allows a judge, by ex parte order, to nullify a mechanic's
lien and substitute in its place a bond upon personal sureties,
thereby substituting for the collateral of the land the personal
guarantee of someone who may be in bankruptcy the next day. The
whole notion is absurd, and the error was corrected.
What no doubt really happened is that Deseret loaned
against the property, and either the money to cover Jack Daniels'
lien has been set aside in escrow by the owner or the title
company has accepted indemnification by the owner, Deseret, or
both, or a portion of the loan by Deseret has been set aside in
escrow to indemnify against the outcome of this case. Those
i

probable facts will not be known for sure until discovery is
undertaken.
It nevertheless seems clear from the foregoing that
Deseret had not only constructive, but no doubt had actual notice
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of the claims of Jack Danielsf and no doubt knew of the lawsuit
which had been brought by CEN, and no doubt actually knew the
substance of the claims of Jack Daniels. There is therefore no
basis whatsoever to suppose that Deseret was not fully aware of
the claims of Jack Daniels at the time it elected to loan on this
project.
D.

DESERET HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE RISK.

Deseret asserts a number of times in its brief that the
purpose of the requirement for recording a mechanic's lien is to
enable subsequent purchasers and mortgagees to "assess the risk."
In this action Deseret took its interest nearly a month after the
recording of the mechanic's lien, and if the purpose of actually
recording the mechanic's lien is to allow subsequent purchasers
and mortgagees to assess their risk, that has been fully
accomplished in this action. When Deseret decided to loan on this
project, it had constructive notice of Daniels' claim, could have
made inquiry of him as to the nature of his claim, and as noted
above was no doubt fully cognizant of Jack Daniels' position in
actual fact. Having been advised of Daniels' mechanic's lien
through constructive notice (and we believe discovery will reveal
actual notice), Deseret was at liberty to proceed as it deemed
advisable.

If it felt Daniels' claim was invalid, it could take

the risk of that belief. On the other hand, if Daniels is able to
establish his claim in this proceeding, Deseret has not been hurt
as it assumed the risk of that claim.

-13-

Deseret chose, with knowledge of Daniels' claim, to go
forward with the transaction, and it has no doubt protected itself
and stands to lose nothing in this matter.

The only entity who

will stand to lose anything in this transaction if the court
upholds Daniels1 claim to an estoppel is the owner, and it is the
owner who ought to be bound by the agreement which was made to pay
Daniels, and the owner should not be allowed to escape the
consequences of its conduct which resulted in the estoppel.
E.

ESTOPPEL WILL BE USELESS UNLESS SUBSEQUENT GRANTEES

(MORTGATEES) ARE BOUND.
If the court holds that the mechanic's lien is valid
against the owner, but not against the subsequent mortgagee who
takes with notice, the estoppel will be of no value whatever. The
owner can misrepresent to the laborer that he will be paid if he
will not timely file his lien and then, after the time has run,
sell or mortgage the property (even to one having actual or
constructive knowledge, or both) and do so with complete impunity,
thereby nullifying the estoppel. The owner can then take its
proceeds of the sale or loan, spend or hide them, and leave the
laborer with no recourse, notwithstanding his attempt to cooperate
with the owner to help the owner out in a difficult situation. The
laborer should not be penalized for trying to assist the owner, at
least where the subsequent mortgagee has notice of the claim.
At page 28 of its brief Deseret sets forth the following
quotation:
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"laws enacted for the protection of third persons
should not be permitted to be waived since third persons
interested in the statutes are not made party to the
waiver."
That quotation does not appear to be directed at a
situation such as that present in this case. If Deseret had
acquired its interest prior to the waiverf then the aforesaid
quote would be applicable, and perhaps the owner would not be
permitted to waive a statute which has already given a vested
interest to a third party.

In the instant casef however, the

waiver took place long before Deseret acquired any interest in the
property. Deseret is a grantee (mortgagee) of the very party
whose conduct created the estoppel and as grantee (mortgagee)
should not be permitted to acquire an interest superior to its
grantor where it takes with notice of Daniels1 claim.
F.

ALIENABILITY UNAFFECTED.

Deseret argues at page 27 of its brief that requiring
Deseret to take subject to whatever Daniels is able to establish
under its mechanic's lien will somehow be detrimental to the
alienability of the real property.

We do not think that requiring

Deseret to assume the risk of the notice afforded by the recorded
lien has anything to do with alienability.

Any property which is

subject to a mortgage, trust deed or other lien only has it
alienability impaired if the owner expects a buyer to accept the
property without the seller making provision for the lien. It is
normally irrelevant to a buyer whether all of the purchase price
goes to the owner or some of it goes to the owner and some of it

-15-

goes to the holder of the mortgage; it has nothing to do with
alienability.

Failure to hold Deseret to responsibility for

whatever Daniels is able to establish for his lien will encourage
fraud and discourage legitimate cooperation between owners of
property and those who perform labor on it. What does society
gain by a rule that would in effect prohibit a laborer from
cooperating with the owner of property in terms of helping him out
financially as it relates to a lender who takes with full notice
of that situation as in the instant case.
G.

RULE OF BELTLINE BRICK CO. V. STANDARD HOME

BUILDERS WILL NOT "EVISCERATE" UTAH LIEN STATUTE.
Deseret appears to accept all of the authorities cited
by Daniels in its brief under Point II with the exception of
Beltline Brick Company v. Standard Home Builders, 213 NW 41 (Minn.
1927).

Deseret appears to concede that that case stands directly

in favor of Daniels and against Deseret, and argues simply that to
accept that case in Utah would "eviscerate" Utah mechanic's lien
filing requirements.
It should be noted that Minnesota had a filing deadline
for mechanic's liens, and the whole point of the Beltline case is
that under certain circumstances that deadline should not be
enforceable against the laborer. The case in that state was not
intended to "eviscerate" its filing requirements and certainly did
not do so.

It is a rule calculated to do justice in those

circumstances where it is applicable.
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The same is certainly true in the state of Utah.
The application of that rule in this state is not going to
"eviscerate" the filing requirement, but it will prohibit an owner
or contractor from defrauding those it induces to rely upon its
representations of payment, to their detriment.
The trial court referred to the Beltline case as an
"aberration."

If it is an aberration, then we should have pointed

out to us the numerous cases which stand for the opposite
proposition, and that has not been done by Deseret, nor by the
judge below.
H.

UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN V. MECHAM NOT APPLICABLE.

At page 30 of its brief Deseret refers to the case of
Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham, 12 Ut 2d 335, 366, P2d 598 (1961)
as standing for the proposition that Deseret can only be charged
with an estoppel if it participated in "some concealment,
misrepresentation, act, or declaration" itself.

The aforesaid

quoted language from the Mecham case is entirely inapplicable to
the instant fact situation.

In the Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham

case the issue was the priority between the holder of a
construction mortgage and several mechanic's lien claimants. In
that case the construction mortgage had priority over the
mechanic's liens as it had been recorded before the holders of
those liens commenced work.

The holders of those liens, however,

claimed that the lender (holder of the construction mortgage) was
not obliged to advance the monies thereunder, and therefore that
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they should have priority over any monies advanced by the lender
after they commenced their work.

The court held, however, that

the lender was obliged to pay out the money in accordance with the
directions of the borrower and that the holder of the construction
mortgage would have priority to the extent of monies actually
advanced unless the lender "is in someway estopped from asserting
his priority."
In that context the court goes on to say that a lender
could be estopped through "some concealment, misrepresentation,
act, or declaration by the mortgagee upon which the lienholder
properly relied and by which he was induced to act differently
than he otherwise would have acted."

The court found no such

estoppel in that case. The estoppel being considered in that case
is entirely different from the estoppel which is the subject of
the instant action.

In Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham the

construction lender had priority unless it gave that priority away
through its misconduct.

In the instant action Deseret never had

priority as its title was subject to the estoppel from the moment
it acquired an interest in the property.
We feel that the care of In re Williamsen, 43 B.R. 813
(U. S. Bankruptcy Court, D.Utah 1984) cited by Deseret is not in
point.

In that case Judge Clark ruled that certain mechanic's

liens were null and void as lacking the "essential signature."
The issue therefore was not whether the lien claimants had the
right to file their liens after the statutory period by reason of
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estoppel or otherwise, but rather the court found that the lien,
though timely filed, lacked signature and was therefore void. The
court went on to state that where the document is void on its
face, it does not constitute notice. Judge Clark goes on and
apparently holds that where the lien is invalid on its face as
lacking a proper signature, it does not constitute constructive
notice, and "actual notice" thereof does not revive a void lien.
Judge Clark seems to hold that a subsequent encumbrancer (even if
he checks the record and sees that a mechanic's lien has been
filed which is void on its face) is entitled to proceed as though
the lien did not exist. Judge Clark seems to feel that as the
lien never existed, there was nothing about which a subsequent
encumbrancer could have actual knowledge.
In the instant case, however, the lien filed by Daniels
was not void on its face, and it is Daniels' position that Deseret
was not entitled to ignore the lien and is charged with whatever
Daniels is able to establish thereunder.
At page 824 of the decision in In re Williamsen the
court discusses the fact that the debtor "completed, acknowledged
and notarized" the liens and that the claimants had asserted that
because the owner had prepared the liens, and the errors in the
preparation were his and not the claimants', the claimant should
not be charged with those errors. The court characterized that
argument as an "estoppel" argument, although the court noted that
the claimaints had not so characterized that argument. The court
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went on to point out that the "estoppel" argument might be
persuasive if the debtor were attacking the liens, but that since
the person attacking the liens was another creditor, the argument
lacked persuasion.

No details of the relationship between the

debtor and that particular creditor are given in the opinion.
The court in discussing the "estoppel" argument refers
to Baqqs v. Anderson. 528 P2d 141 (Utah 1974) and Rayner v. H.
Line Transport Inc., 15 Ut 2d 427, 394 P2d 383 (1964), both of
which cases involved conduct (constituting the alleged estoppel)
which was that of a person or entity not in privity with the
person sought to be estopped.

In the Baqqs case the statement by

a stepfather was held not to be binding on the natural mother, and
in the H. Line case a statement by the insurance carrier to
another insurance company regarding subrogation was held not to be
binding upon the insured in an action brought by the insured.
It seems clear that Judge Clark in citing Baqqs v. H.
Line did not consider estoppel from the standpoint of privity, and
we respectfully submit that the Williamsen case is thus
distinguishable from the instant case. It is of course in any
event for the Utah Supreme Court to declare the substantive law of
Utah and not for the federal courts.
I.

NO REQUIREMENT THAT LIEN USE THE WORD "ESTOPPEL."

At page 25 of its brief Deseret points out in Note 4
that the mechanic's lien as recorded by Daniels did not refer to
I
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the fact of estoppel by its terms. Even though the lien may not
use the word, "estoppel," Deseret does not contend that had
Daniels used that word that Deseret would have taken subject to
the lien. It appears rather to be Deseret's position that it
could ignore the lien whether it used the word "estoppel" or not.
Certainly the absence or presence of the word "estoppel" is not
determinative in this case. Deseret, having acquired its interest
with knowledge of the lien, must take subject to whatever Daniels
can establish for the lien. There is certainly no showing that
the conduct of Deseret was or would have been affected one way or
the other by the presence or absence of the word "estoppel," but
that of course is a factual matter in any event, and appellant is
entitled to discovery on that point and (if it is indeed an issue)
to have the matter considered by the factfinder.

It would not be

a proper matter for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that
the summary judgment of the lower court be reversed and that this
case be remanded for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Appellant

-21-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant were mailed to the following attorneys for
respondent,
prepaid, the

Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, postage
day of June, 1987:

David R. Olsen
Carl F. Huefner
Charles P. Sampson
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for Appellant
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Jeffrey o. Brown
SPENCER <5c BROWN
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-8077
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
ORDER DISCHARGING
CLAIMS

Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK C. DANIELS, DEBRA
ESTES, SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA
ANN SITZBERGER, and AMY
STANTON EAGLESON,

Civil No.

<^o

Defendants.

Upon the motion of plaintiff and upon consideration of the verified complaint of
plaintiff, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the recorded claims of the defendants as decribed in
plaintiff's complaint are hereby released from real property of plaintiff, and shall
have no effect as a lien or interest whatsoever upon said real property, more
particularly described as follows:
All of Lots 8, 9, & 10, and the South 1/2 of Lots 11 <5c 22, and all of
Lots 23, 24 & 25, Block 4 SNYDERS ADDITION to Park City,
according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the
Summit County Recorder's Office.
upon the posting of bond in the amount of $75,000.
In that plaintiff has alleged that it will suffer inseparable harm as a result of its
'

inability to close financing as a result of said claims, this order is granted ex parte.

' , Dated: February 29^,
U

1982 at

ftfy»An_.
By the Court:

AbUVj»tiwj T

320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone 322-1141

f%mm*>*+

—•"•—

84111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
)

vs.

ORDER

JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,
Civil No. 6790
Defendants.

'

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the
21stday of June 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
judge of the above-entitled court, on the Motion of plaintiff,
for Summary Judgment.

The plaintiff appeared by and through

its attorney, Keith W. Meade, and the defendant, Jack C. Daniels,
appeared by and through his attorneys, Gordon A. Madsen and
Robert C. Cummings, and the Court, having heard the arguments
of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff1s said Motion for Summary Judgment

2.

Any Lis Pendens filed in connection with this

is denied.

matter should be, and is, vacated and canceled.

DATED

t h i s

/

^

dc-j o f
BY THE

#-120

Ji#*^1982,

Telephone

322-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
AMENDED ORDER
vs.
JftCK C. DANIELS, et al.,

Civil No. 6790

Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the
21st day of June 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
judge of the above-entitled court, on the Motion of plaintiff
for Summary Judgment.

The plaintiff appeared by and through

its attorney, Keith W. Meade, and defendant, Jack C. Daniels,
appeared by and through his attorneys, Gordon A. Madsen and
Robert C. Cummings, and the Court, having heard the arguments
of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement;
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, but any

Lis Pendens should be and is vacated and cancelled.
2.

Lien not pancelled or vacated.

DATED this /,

i-'d-A

day ot'Zr^'^^^-f^y

, 1983

Keith. W. Meade
Attorney for Plaintiff
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111
Telephone: (801> 3Sa-^46&- •IN THE THIBD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
N

^

MICHAEL McCOY, d/b/a,
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah joint
venture,
Plaintiff,

:

AMENDED COMPLAINT

-vs-»
JACK C» DANIELS, d/b/a
J.O. CONSTUCTION, DELTA
FIRE SYSTEMS, INC*, a Utah.

:
" Civil No, C 82 4628
\

Plaintiff, for causa of action* alleges as follows r
THE PARTIES
1. Defendant Jack C. Daniels, hereinafter "Daniels", is
a resident of Salt Lake County.
2.

Plaintiff has acquired all of the interest of Park

is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County, Utah.
4. Defendant Eaton Electric has its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5. Defendant Eugene A. Kynaston, d/b/a Mid Valley Roofing,
Co., hereinafter "kynaston", is a resident of Salt Lake County. ^
THE PACTS
6. On or aibout August 24, 19.80, Daniels agreed, inter alia,

Note:

This pleading referred to at page 9 of Supplemental Memorandum
of Daniels (R 134) . Not yet introduced in evidence
as case disposed of on Motion to Dismiss.

to:
a.

construct a condominium in Park City, Utah
on behalf of Park Avenue Development; (.contract
attached as exhibit "A"} .

b. .supply quality labor and materials for the
construction of the condominium;
c.

provide said materials' and perform said work
to the satisfaction of plaintiff;

d.

exercise control over disbursements from the
•construction loan; and

e*

obtain the lowest bids for subcontracted work
and materials which would preserve the quality
of the project.

7.

Daniels entered into a subcontract with. Delta Fire *

Systems, Inc.., whereby Delta would install fire sprinkler equipment in the condominium.
3.

Daniels entered into a subcontract with Eaton Electric

install all of the electrical wiring: in. the condominium.
9.

Daniels entered into a subcontract with Mid-Valley

Roofing Company to install the roof on the condominium. '
10.

The construction was, completed in June 1981, and subsequent

to the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy in July, 1981, the
following material defects have been discovered:
a^jfcjie roof leaks ixLsasmml
b.

locations:.

_

electrical wiring was net. completed in several
of the units in the condominium;

, c.

the sprinkler systems were not properly installed
and froze and burst as a result;

d.

the outdoor hot tub was not adequate to- perform
in cold weather.

11.

Plaintiff substantially performed its obligations pursuant

to the contract.
FTHS7 CAUSE OF ACTION
12.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through

13.

Defendants, including "Daniels'*, impliedly warranted

that the condominium would be erected in /a workmanlike manne
and in accordance with good usage and accepted practices in the
community.
14 . Defendants have breached their warranty with respect
*•»
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to the items s e t fort&JJL^^fl^aph ^eTT above, ,jcjkusing p l a i n t i f f
to s u f f e r damages to- property and l o s s of income from r e n t a l s .
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
15.

Plaintiff incorporates^ herein paragraphs one through,

eleven.
16.

Defendants owed plaintiff a duty to perform the contract

in a workmanlike and complete manner.
17.

Defendants breached said duty as set: forth in paragraph

ten hereinabove.
13.

As a. proximate result of said breach, plaintiff has

suffered damage to property and loss of income from, rentals..
THZSO. CAUSE: OF ACTION
19.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through

eleven.
2Q.

Defendant "Daniels* contracted to provide all the materials

and perform all work described in the approved drawings and
specifications to the satisfaction of plaintiff.
21.

Defendant "Daniels" and the other defendants as sub—

contractors under Daniels control failed ta provide said materials
and perform said work to plaintiff's reasonable satisfaction as
set forth in paragraph 10 above.
22.

Defendants have breached their contracts with respect to

the terms set forth in paragraph ten above.
23.

Plaintiff has been damaged by defendants' breach of

contract, including damage to property and Loss of income from
rentals.

FOURTH GAUSS: or ACTIO::

. 24 • 'Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through
ileven.
22.

Plaintiff relied upon Daniel's superior knowledge in

instruction matters *r*g granted him control over all construction
iisbursements«
26.

Daniels owed plaintiff a contractual *ai, fiduciary duty

-o complete the project using the most cost efficient sources
without affecting quality.
2?.

Daniels breached this duty in that he fariled to acquire

competitive bids. for various aspects of the project, and made
payments to subcontractors in' excess of the fair value of their
services.
2S.

As a result of said breech, plaintiff has suffered

damage in an amount unknown to it, but known to Daniels, as measured
by -excessive .payments for services and materials
WBEBEFOSE, plaintiff prays for relief «s follows.:
1.

That Daniels account to plaintiff for all disbursements

2.

That plaintiff be awarded damages in an' amount to be

made;

shown at trial, resulting from the .conduct alleged herein, which
amount plaintiff believes to be not less than $100,000;
3.

That plaintiff be awarded its costs, attorney's fees,

and such other and further relief as is just in the premises.
DATED this

• day of

September, 1982.

Keith w. tteade

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss,
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
RENON ANDERSON

_, being duly sworn, says:

That he/she is employed in the offices of BROWN & BROWN,
Attorneys for

Plaintiff

'_

.

herein
that he/she served the attached

Amended Complaint

upon
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to

L. Rich Humphreys, Esq. Kearns Building, Suite $900, SLC

Gordon A. Madsen, Esq., 320 South* 300 East, SLC, Utah

34101

34010

Kenneth H. Kisatake, Esq.
1825 South 700 East
SLC, Utah

3 4 015

and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
th^deon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
tneijec
^ a y of

, 198?

<u^^

*ON ANDERSON
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
_

day of

, 198 .

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
/
/

